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THE LIKELY CONSEQUENCES OF
INTERNET VOTING FOR
POLITICAL REPRESENTATION
R. Michael Alvarez* and Jonathan Nagler**
I. hINTERNET VOTING AND POLITICAL REPRESENTATION
The introduction of new and improved communication tech-
nologies has always influenced the conduct of political campaigns
and elections. Early in the twentieth century, the advent of wide-
spread radio communication gave politicians the ability to reach into
the living rooms of American citizens.' In the 1950s and thereafter,
television dramatically changed the marketing of political candidates
and their electoral strategies; televised events like the Kennedy-
Nixon presidential election debate, the airing of Johnson's "Daisy"
advertisement in the 1964 election, and most recently the infamous
Bush "Willie Horton" advertisement, all have been seen as having a
pivotal impact on presidential elections.
2
Most recently the rapid rise of the Internet and the World Wide
Web has begun to impact the conduct of political campaigns and
elections. It is now quite common for political candidates, even can-
didates for state and local offices, to have their own sites on the
World Wide Web. Candidates such as Jesse Ventura and John
* Associate Professor of Political Science in the Division of Humanities
and Social Sciences at the California Institute of Technology. He can be
reached at rma@hss.caltech.edu.
** Associate Professor of Politics in the Department of Politics at New
York University. He can be reached atjonathan.nagler@nyu.edu. The authors
thank David Elliot for his comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
1. See The First 50 Years of Broadcasting, BROADCASTING, Oct. 13, 1980,
at 82.
2. See KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, PACKAGING THE PRESIDENCY: A
HISTORY AND CRITICISM OF PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ADVERTISING xix-xxii
(3d ed. 1996).
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McCain employed their Internet sites for interactive contact with
voters and contributors in recent elections. 3 The mass media now
covers political events such as the 2000 party conventions using the
Internet, with downloadable distribution of media reports and politi-
cal speeches in both text and multimedia formats.
One other obvious political use of the Internet and the World
Wide Web is for the conduct of elections. Given widespread pene-
tration of the Internet throughout American society, the relative ease
with which balloting could be conducted on the Internet, and the po-
tential cost-savings of "elections-on-the-net," there has been much
discussion of electronic balloting across the nation. There are a
number of private companies that provide electronic balloting tech-
nologies for non-political balloting such as union elections and proxy
voting for mutual fund companies. 4 To date, only one major political
election has been conducted on the Internet-the 2000 Democratic
Presidential Primary in Arizona, an Internet election that we will dis-
cuss much more fully later in this paper.5 Other states, most notably
California, have carefully studied the potential of Internet elections.6
One of the most important political and legal issues surrounding
the debates about electronic balloting fundamentally concerns what
political scientists call "political representation." 7 A critical political
question about electronic balloting is whether it will have an impact
on political representation, broadly defined. A critical legal question
about electronic balloting is whether it will violate the Voting Rights
3. See Rebecca Fairley Raney, Former Wrestler's Campaign Got a Boost
from the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1998, at B10; Christy True, Presiden-
tial Candidates Cast for Votes in Cyberspace, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 27, 2000,
at Cl.
4. See, e.g., Gary Chapman, Casting a Vote of Caution on Online Voting,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 20,2000, at C3.
5. See Ben White, Online Balloting: A Question of Fairness; Justice De-
partment Challenges Arizona's Use of Voting by Computer in Primary, WASH.
POST, Mar. 19, 2000, at A9.
6. See generally BILL JONES, CAL. INTERNET VOTING TASK FORCE, A
REPORT ON THE FEASIBILITY OF INTERNET VOTING: JANUARY 2000 (finding
that an appropriate balance between security, ease of use, and accessibility
must be met before Internet voting can be implemented).
7. See HANNAH FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 1
(1967).
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Act,8 which is a narrowly defined way to look at political representa-
tion by focusing only on minority voting rights. The purpose of our
research reported in this paper is to shed some light on both the po-
litical and legal aspects of electronic balloting.
The general principle of representation is quite intuitive. If we
consider a hypothetical group of citizens, and a hypothetical legisla-
ture producing public policies, most intuitive definitions of repre-
sentation require that there be some correspondence between prefer-
ences over policies by the citizens and the policy outputs of the
legislature. Typically speaking, political scientists would see an
electoral or political system as strongly representative when there is a
close correlation between the preferences of the citizenry and the
legislative outputs; likewise, a system which does not produce a
close correspondence between citizen preferences and policy outputs
would be seen as poorly representative. Hanna Pitkin described sev-
eral types of representation. 9 The concepts useful to us here are
those of "descriptive representation" and "substantive representa-
tion."10 Regarding the first concept, we say that a polity meets the
goal of descriptive representation if the policy makers resemble the
citizens on politically relevant characteristics." What exactly quali-
fies as a politically relevant dimension may be subject to some de-
bate. But in the United States most people would agree that age, in-
come, ethnicity, and gender are politically relevant characteristics.'
2
Thus, any change in the law which increased the participation of one
age, income, ethnic, or gender group relative to another group would
alter the state of descriptive representation. A polity would meet the
goal of the second concept, substantive representation, if the policy
makers had preferences similar to the preferences of the citizens. Of
course in the case of Internet voting we cannot yet look directly at
the fit between policy makers and citizens, as there have not yet
8. Voting Rights Act of 1965,42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1994).
9. See PrrKIN, supra note 7, at 1.
10. See id. at 60-62.
11. See id. at 114-15. Pitkin uses the term "acting for" to indicate substan-
tive representation.
12. See, e.g., Jan E. Leighley & Jonathan Nagler, Socioeconomic Class Bias
in Turnout, 1964-1988: The Voters Renain the Same, 86 AM. POL. S. REv.
725 (1992).
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been enough elections conducted using Internet voting to allow for
such an analysis.'
3
Rather we will assess the representativeness of Internet voting
by comparing the set of citizens currently voting to those who would
be voting if Internet voting were implemented. If we observe sharp
differences, either descriptively or substantively, between these two
sets of voters, we will see that as evidence of a change in representa-
tion caused by Internet voting.
14
It is easily demonstrated that election laws and balloting proce-
dures have direct and measurable influences on political representa-
tion. For instance, election or ballot laws that restrict political par-
ticipation to only certain demographic groups and exclude others,
such as laws that restricted women or African Americans from hav-
ing the right to vote, remove certain demographic groups from the
political process and thereby do not allow their preferences to be ex-
pressed in elections.' 5 To the extent to which excluded demographic
groups have distinctly different preferences about public policy out-
comes, relative to demographic groups which are not excluded from
the electoral process, political representation suffers as elected
13. For example, an ideal situation would be for us to observe a state in
which elected legislators used polling place voting for a decade, then shifted
exclusively to Internet voting for a decade. We could then observe the nature
of the electorate under polling place and Internet voting, as well as the de-
scriptive attributes and policy-making behavior of the elected representatives
in that state. For example, if we observed that the electorate changed after the
imposition of Internet voting, shifting to a higher income, higher educational
attainment, and less racially diverse set of voters, we could trace how the
change in the electorate influenced the behavior of elected representatives.
Such a natural experiment has not yet been undertaken; we do not have the
data to undertake such a study.
14. Of course, we are assuming that the types of voters who participate de-
tennine the types of policy makers who are elected. Thus if we observe an
electorate which is skewed in certain demographic attributes, we are assuming
that such an electorate would elect similarly skewed representatives.
15. See ANNA L. HARVEY, VOTES WITHOUT LEVERAGE: WOMEN IN
AMERICAN ELECTORAL POLITICS, 1920-1970 (1998) (examining the effects of
laws prohibiting the participation of women); V.0. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN
POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION (1949) (analyzing the evolution of suffrage
restrictions); J. MORGAN KoUSSER, COLORBLIND INJUSTICE: MINORITY
VOTING RIGHTS AND THE UNDOING OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION (1999)
(examining past voter discrimination against African Americans).
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representatives have little incentive to elicit or to follow the prefer-
ences of the excluded groups.
When it comes to electronic elections, therefore, a very impor-
tant question is whether the demographic differences we observe
between those with Internet access and those without (commonly re-
ferred to as the "digital divide") may make electronic elections less
representative than traditional in-person precinct balloting or vote-
by-mail. In this Article we examine this question directly, beginning
with a discussion of the set of electoral reforms we regard as closest
to Internet voting. There have been many other legal changes in the
last twenty years to lower the barriers to voting and registration. In
particular, the liberalization of absentee balloting and the advent of
vote-by-mail elections have made it easier for people to vote. And
barriers to registration have continued to fall, culminating with the
National Voter Registration Act (hereinafter "NVRA" or "Motor
Voter"), the most famous provision of which guarantees that citizens
will be given the chance to register to vote whenever they renew
their driver's licenses.' 6 We view Internet voting as another way to
lower the barriers to voting. The distinction between Internet voting
and the above-named reforms is that Internet voting has the greatest
potential to impart an even stronger upper-class bias to the electorate
than exists today.
There is no disagreement that the voters in the United States are
wealthier, more educated, and more often white than the citizenry as
a whole.17 Whether there has been a change over time in this class-
bias of the electorate is a matter of debate.18 However, while the
primary provision of the NVRA does help people who have at least
enough income to apply for a drivers license, it does not discriminate
between people driving Hyundais and people driving BMWs.
19
Internet voting offers the greatest assistance to people who have
Internet access from home. As we will show below, this means that
Internet voting has the potential to offer more assistance to
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-3(a)-(c) (1994).
17. See Leighley & Nagler, supra note 11, at 728.
18. See id. at 734; Walter Dean Burnham, The Turnout Problem, in
ELECTIONS AMERICAN STYLE 97, 125 (A. James Reichley ed., 1987).
19. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg.
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those who are white and of higher incomes than to blacks and those
with lower incomes.
After we review the existing academic literature on NVRA and
vote-by-mail elections, we turn more directly to the Internet and
electronic elections. First we look carefully at the "digital divide" in
the United States using recent survey data. Then we examine the
sole existing electoral experiment with Internet voting: the 2000
Arizona Democratic Presidential Primary. Subsequently, we con-
sider the possible constituencies for Internet voting, using polling
data from California. We conclude with a summary of our results
and our inferences regarding the representational consequences of
Internet voting.
II. REGISTRATION, TURNOUT, AND REPRESENTATION
Voting in the United States is a two-part act. Persons must first
register to vote, and then actually vote. The first hurdle, registration,
eliminates a sizable portion of the electorate. The low registration
rate in the United States is the most compelling explanation for the
low turnout in the United States relative to most industrial democra-
cies.20 In 1996, only 65.9% of the voting age population in the
United States even claimed to be registered to vote (Census Bureau,
Current Population Reports).21 In the most influential modem work
on voter turnout, Wolfinger and Rosenstone focused on reforming
registration laws as the most effective way to increase the turnout
rate in the United States.22 The key provision that they cite is the re-
quirement that citizens must register in advance of the election.
23
Various estimates suggest that if all states allowed for same-day
20. See, e.g., Robert S. Erikson, Why Do People Vote? Because They Are
Registered, 9 AM. POL. Q. 259 (1981) (speculating that the act of registering
heavily influences voting).
21. See Lynn M. Casper & Lorreta E. Brass, Current Population Reports:
Voting and Registration in the Election of November 1996, in U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU 2 tbl.2 (July 1998), available at http://www.census.gov/ prod/3/
98pubs/p20-504.pelf, Bill Jones, Statement of Vote: Primary Election, in U.S.
CENSUS CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS 20-466 (1998).
22. See RAYMOND E. WOLFINGER & STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE, WHO
VOTES? 61-88 (1980). Their findings were confirmed and extended in
Leighley & Nagler, supra note 11.
23. See WOLFINGER & ROSENSTONE, supra note 22, at 61.
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registration, turnout would increase by between five and ten percent.
Furthermore, Wolfinger and Rosenstone argued that registration hur-
dles had a larger deterrent effect on the poorly educated than the well
educated.24 The argument was that voters with lower levels of edu-
cation would be less able to overcome the bureaucratic hurdles im-
posed by early registration requirements.25 Regardless of whether or
not one accepts Wolfinger and Rosenstone's contention that registra-
tion barriers prove the greatest hurdle for the least educated, one the-
ory holds that any reform which increases turnout is likely to help the
representation of people with lower socio-economic status. The ar-
gument is that since more poor people are "at risk" of not voting than
rich people are, reforms that increase voting will increase voting
more among the poor. Consider a case where 50% of poor people
vote and 90% of rich people vote. Then any reform to increase turn-
out can increase the turnout rate among rich people by at most 10%.
But because of the larger pool of non-voting poor, even if the reform
only affects one out of five of poor persons not voting, that will lead
to an increase in the turnout rate of 10% among poor people. Notice
that this logic unravels if the reform being contemplated is one that
would explicitly help rich people. This is the potential problem with
Internet voting. If the reform is one that will act only on people in
the high end of the socio-economic scale, those with home comput-
ers and ISP subscriptions, then the reform will not have the repre-
sentation-increasing property.
This leads us to the first empirical question at hand: Have the
reforms enacted over the past several decades making it easier to
vote led to any increase in the representation of the electorate? Or,
have poor people or rich people been more likely to take advantage
of these reforms? There are two behavioral hypotheses underlying
the two possibilities. First, it is possible that it is only rich people
who want to vote. If this were the case, then making it easier to vote
would only increase the turnout rate of rich people. If poor people
simply did not want to vote, then we could literally hand them ballots
24. See id. at 79.
25. See id.; Jonathan Nagler, The Effect of Registration Laws and Educa-
tion on U.S. Voter Turnout, 85 AM. POL. Scd. REV. 1393, 1395-1403 (1991);
Jonathan Nagler, Scobit: An Alternative Estimator to Logit and Probit, 38 AM.
J. POL. Sci. 230,230-55 (1994).
ApJril 2001] 1121
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW
affixed with postage, give them a pen to mark the ballots, provide
them with information on the candidates, and they might still toss the
ballots in the trash. Second, the Wolfinger and Rosenstone hypothe-
sis could be correct and poor people may want to vote just as much
as rich people, but they simply have trouble with the registration re-
quirements and other hurdles imposed by the state. If this were the
case then changes in election procedures that make it easier to vote
could raise the voting rate of poor people and close the gap in voting
rates between rich and poor.
To test these alternative views of the impact of registration re-
forms on the representativeness of the electorate, we can examine the
impact of the National Voter Registration Act, absentee balloting,
and vote-by-mail elections.
A. Results of Reforms: Motor Voter and Vote-by-Mail
The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 stipulated that each
state would "include a voter registration application form for elec-
tions for Federal office" as part of the application for a driver's li-
cense. 26 The states were given leeway as to whether this would be a
single form or multiple forms. And states were also required to al-
low for mail-in registration and agency-based registration. These
provisions were only required for states without same-day registra-
tion. However, as only North Dakota, Maine, Minnesota, and Wis-
consin had same-day registration, the impact of the Act was wide-
spread. As with most forms of election laws, prior to the enactment
of the NVRA there was considerable variation across the states, 27 as
well as variation in the speed of implementation of the law.
In one of the earliest and more rigorous pieces examining the ef-
fect of the NVRA, Stephen Knack analyzed state level election data
from 1976 through 1992 to examine the impact of voluntary state
implementation of NVRA provisions predating actual passage of
NVRA. 28 Knack followed Crocker's previous (1990) analysis 29 in
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg (1994).
27. See generally Stephen Knack, Does "Motor Voter" Work? Evidence
From State-Level Data, 57 J. POL. 796 (1995) (detailing the effects of NVRA).
28. See id.
29. See ROYCE CROCKER, VOTER REGISTRATION AND TURNOUT IN STATES
WITH MAIL AND MOTOR-VOTER REGISTRATION SYSTEMS 3 (1990).
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distinguishing "active" programs from "passive" programs, and also
adds the following distinction to mail-in programs. 30 Motor voter
states are defined as having active programs if there is a provision on
the driver's license application form asking applicants if they wish to
register to vote, or if an employee of the Department of Motor Vehi-
cles is required by statute to ask them if they wish to do so. 31 States
are defined as having passive programs if neither of these provisions
is met.32 States with passive programs then make voter-registration
forms available at motor vehicle offices, but applicants need to seek
them out.33 The NVRA explicitly requires what is categorized here
as an active program. Knack defines mail-in programs as active if
they require neither notarization nor witnessing.34 Again, this is con-
sistent with the NVRA which explicitly forbade states from adding
such provisions to mail-in registration forms. 35 Knack estimates that
the cumulative impact of the motor voter provisions when adopted
across all states would be an increase in registration of 10%, and an
increase in turnout in presidential elections of less than 3%.36 Notice
that these estimates support the view that people do not register be-
cause they do not want to vote. According to Knack's estimates,
only 30% of the new registrants would be voters. 37 This is less than
half the turnout rate of current registrants.
While his focus is not on the provisions of the NVRA, Benjamin
Highton provides another look at the impact of registration
changes.38 Highton compares reported turnout in states with same-
day registration to reported turnout in other states and to the turnout
of all other registered voters. 39  Highton notes several important
30. See Knack, supra note 27, at 800.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 806 tbl.3.
37. See id. at 802. This really is not Knack's estimate; it is a figure he cites
from the District of Columbia.
38. See Benjamin Highton, Easy Registration and Voter Turnout, 59 J. POL.
565 (1997).
39. Highton uses the Census Bureau's 1980 and 1992 Current Population
Survey as his data source. Thus, the figures he provides are self-reported rates
for both registration and voting.
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facts.40 First, turnout in the same-day registration states is signifi-
cantly lower than turnout of registered voters in other states (77%
versus 90%). 4 1 This suggests that there is some self-selection to
registration. If registration functioned purely as a barrier to turnout,
then the turnout of those in same-day registration would be the same
as the turnout of registered voters in other states. That turnout in
same-day registration states is lower suggests that registration acts as
a screen as well as a barrier; those who have registered in other states
are the people who are interested in being voters.
Highton also notes that the gap in turnout between poorly edu-
cated and well-educated persons is lower in same-day registration
states than for poorly educated and well-educated persons in other
states. 42 For instance, 59% of persons with some high school educa-
tion voted in same-day registration states, compared to the 93% of
persons with a college degree who voted in same-day registration
states, for a gap of 34%.43 In states without same-day registration the
comparable numbers are 49% and 86%, for a gap of 37%.44 Thus,
same-day registration seems to lower the turnout gap, leading to a
more representative electorate. Also, this suggest that removing the
chore of registration will help poorly educated voters more than well-
educated voters.
If Highton's data is examined, however, it can be seen that these
results truly reflect the overall higher levels of turnout in the same-
day registration states. The question can thus be asked: Who is
more likely to take advantage of same-day registration, poorly edu-
cated or well-educated persons? In Table 1, we reproduce one sec-
tion of Highton's Table 1,45 giving the voting rate of the three rele-
vant groups, categorized by level of education: persons in same-day
registration states; eligible voters in other states; and registered vot-
ers in other states. In addition, we compute the hypothetical turnout
rate for non-voters in each education group as if they were passively
registered. For instance, in the first row we see that turnout of
40. See id. at 569 tbl.1.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 570.
43. See id. at 569 tbl.1.
44. See id.
45. See id.
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eligible voters with zero to eight years of education in the "Other
States" was 49%, whereas, turnout of the same education bracket in
the same-day registration states was 63%.
TABLE 1: TURNOUT BY REGISTRATION:
SAME-DAY REGISTRATION STATES AND OTHERS
46
Same Day Other States
Education Registration Eligible Registered Hypothetical
on Statesa Voters' Voters' Rate
b
0-8 Years 63 49 81 27
'-(14/51)
9-11 Years 59 49 84 20-(10/51)
12 Years 75 63 90 32
-(12/37)
Some 48Soe83 75 92 4
College -(12125)
College 93 86 96 
64
Degree -(9/14)
Advanced 93 90 96 30
Degree -(3/10)
aCell entries are the reported turnout of each group.
bCell entries in the last column give the hypothetical turnout
rate in each education group of those who had been non-voters
in states requiring advance registration.
Based on these numbers, it can be inferred that of the 51% of the
eligible voters who did not vote in the "Other States," 14% of them
(63% - 49%) would have voted had those not registered been pas-
sively registered through no action of their own. Thus, the turnout
46. See id. (entitled, "Turnout By Registration Context and Demographic
Characteristics" and using data from 1980 and 1992 Current Population Sur-
veys). Alvarez and Nagler modify the Highton table by adding a fourth col-
unin containing computations.
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rate of this group of non-voters were they all registered would be
27% (or 14/51). Thus what this table tells us is extremely important.
Whereas 64% of college educated non-voters would become voters
with zero-cost registration, only 32% of high school educated non-
voters would become voters with zero-cost registration. In a nut-
shell, this is the reformer's dilemma as they try to achieve greater
representation. If voting is made easier, it is those who already tend
to vote who will take advantage of the easier voting. However, we
can also see the arithmetic that tends towards greater representation
as we facilitate voting. While the rate at which persons take advan-
tage of the easier voting is higher among the better educated, because
the pool of uneducated non-voters is so much larger, the effect of the
reform is still to narrow the turnout gap between the education
groups. However, that narrowing is significantly less than that for
which many reformers would have hoped.
B. Voting by Mail
The change in the rules for absentee balloting in many states is
another reform that has reduced the costs of voting. In many states,
including California, voters may vote by absentee ballot on demand:
No reason is necessary to request an absentee ballot. The proportion
of votes cast as absentee ballots in the 1998 statewide primary elec-
tion in California was over 25%. 4 7 In theory, this lowers the cost of
voting as the voter does not need to make a trip to a polling place on
a specific day. Oliver examined the choice voters made as to how to
cast their votes using the 1992 Current Population Survey.48 He used
a multivariate model where the dependent variable was the decision
to vote absentee or cast a polling place ballot. He found that the
higher a respondent's income, the more likely he or she was to cast
an absentee ballot rather than a polling place ballot.49 This is further
evidence that it is those already more likely to vote who are more
likely to take advantage of reforms that lower the cost of voting.
This result is also consistent with the view that one reason why reg-
istration is more difficult for those with low levels of education is
47. See Jones, supra note 21, at iv.
48. See Eric J. Oliver, The Effects of Eligibility Restrictions and Party Ac-
tivity on Absentee Voting and Overall Turnout, 40 AM. J. POL. Sci. 498 (1996).
49. See id. at 505 tbl.2.
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that such people are less accustomed to using the mail for such things
as paying bills.
Moving beyond absentee balloting, some elections are held
where voting by mail is the only way voters can cast ballots. Such
elections are the closest approximation we are aware of to Internet
voting. Oregon is the state with the most experience with vote by
mail (VBM) elections. 50 Oregon has been using vote by mail in local
elections since 1981. In 1987, the state extended vote by mail to in-
dlude all special elections. 51 And in 1998, an initiative extended vote
by mail to all biennial primary and general elections. The motivation
of state officials to adopt vote by mail is similar to motivations to
adopt Internet voting. First, voters like it. Second, such elections
cost less to run.
No doubt the 2000 presidential election, the first presidential
race held as a vote by mail election, will yield fascinating data. But
there has already been one high profile federal race in Oregon held
using vote by mail. There was a special election in January 1996 to
fill Bob Packwood's seat. Priscilla L. Southwell conducted a random
digit dial telephone survey of Oregon voters at the time of the elec-
tion.52 She split respondents into three groups. "Traditional Voters"
were defined as those who voted in 1992 and 1996, and claimed that
they usually voted. "Vote by Mail" voters were those who did not
vote in 1992, but did vote in the 1996 election under the vote by mail
rules; or claimed that they had problems getting to the polls in the
past.53 Finally, "Registered Nonvoters" were simply those respon-
dents who were registered voters but did not vote in the 1996 vote by
mail election. Looking at the demographic characteristics of each of
the three groups Southwell found that Vote by Mail voters are
slightly different than Traditional Voters: They are more likely to be
hourly workers rather than salaried workers, for instance.54 But the
much clearer difference was between both the Traditional Voters and
Vote by Mail voters and the third group: the Registered Nonvoters.
50. See Priscilla L. Southwell & Justin Burchett, Survey of Vote-by-Mail
Senate Election in the State of Oregon, 30 POL. SC. & POL. 53, 53-57 (1997).
51. See id. at 53.
52. See id. at 57.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 56.
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The Registered Nonvoters were clearly a group apart in their demo-
graphic characteristics and in their attitudes (such as how little they
cared about the election and how little attention they paid to politics).
Southwell concluded that vote by mail elections would not change
representation very much, that such elections would in fact pick up
the "cream of the crop" of non-voters.
55
Thus, our review of the literature of the two most important re-
cent reforms attempting to lower the costs of voting-the "Motor
Voter" legislation and experiments with voting by mail-produce
conclusions about Internet voting which are pessimistic. Neither of
these reforms has produced massive increases in voter registration or
turnout, nor have they led to vastly improved political representation.
The results of these election law reforms, in contrast to the goals of
their proponents, have been much more modest. That significant re-
form led to modest changes in registration and turnout suggests that
we should expect the same types of outcomes, at best, from reforms
such as Internet voting. But in the next two sections of this paper we
produce additional evidence which casts doubt on whether even
modest increases in voter turnout and political representation might
be expected from Internet voting, largely because of the so-called
"digital divide" in American society.
III. THE DIGITAL DIVIDE AND POLITICAL REPRESENTATION
Unfortunately, the term digital divide is poorly defined and of-
ten misused. It has come to represent any measured difference be-
tween the Internet-connected population and the general population
at large.56 Also, the general discussion of the digital divide has
tended to focus on comparing the population of Internet users versus
the general population. But for the purposes of examining represen-
tation and voting we might want to compare the population of Inter-
net users to the population of politically active persons or the popu-
lation of frequent voters.
To better delineate the digital divide in America we turn to a
unique telephone poll conducted by CBS News in January 1999-the
55. See id. at 57.
56. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FALLING THROUGH THE NET:
TOwARDs DIGITAL INCLUSION 2 (2000).
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"CBS News, CBS Marketwatch.com Internet Poll." This telephone
poll was conducted from January 27 to February 2, 1999, during
which a sample of 1782 telephone respondents were asked a number
of questions about their Internet use, their perceptions of the Internet,
and a set of background demographic and political questions.
5 7
For our purposes, we are interested in a number of different pos-
sible digital divides, namely, the differences between (1) the popula-
tion of American adults; (2) the Internet-using population; (3) the
politically active population; and (4) the Internet-using, politically
active population. To study these differences, we provide in Tables
2 and 3 the survey marginals computed for each of these relevant
populations.58 In Table 2 we give the marginals for gender, marital
status, region of residence, education, and age; in Table 3 we provide
marginals for partisanship, race, Hispanic identity, political ideology,
and whether the respondent was politically active, computer-
connected, and Internet-capable. By comparing across the columns
in the tables we visualize the digital divide.
TABLE 2: THE DIGITAL DIVIDE, 1999
PART 1
Popu ation
American Politically Internet Internet
Adults Active Users Political
Gender
Men 45.8 44.9 51.5 51.3
Women 54.2 55.1 48.5 48.7
Marital
Status
Married 57.0 62.2 61.1 68.3
57. See CBS NEWS, CBS NEWs INTERNET POLL, at http'//wwv.
CBS.Marketwatch.com (Jan. 1999) [hereinafter CBS NEWS SURVEY].
58. To categorize a survey respondent as politically active or not, we com-
puted a variable based on whether or not a respondent was a registered voter
and whether they participated in the 1996 presidential election. Those who
were both registered and participated in the 1996 presidential election were
classified as politically active; those who were either not registered or were
registered but did not participate in the 1996 presidential election were classi-
fied as non-participatory.
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Population
American Politically Internet Internet
Adults Active Users Political
Widowed 8.3 9.7 2.2 2.1
Divorced 13.9 13.1 13.9 12.9
Separated 2.0 1.6 1.4 1.5
Never
Married 18.8 13.5 21.5 15.3
Region
North E 20.3 19.9 19.6 18.3
North C 26.5 28.0 24.3 25.4
South 34.9 33.8 33.2 33.1
West 18.2 18.3 22.8 23.2
Education
No High
School 7.3 5.2 2.3 1.6
High
School 34.0 29.1 21.6 17.3
Some
College 26.4 27.7 30.0 29.3
College 18.8 22.0 26.0 28.6
Post-Grad 13.5 16.1 20.5 23.3
Age
18-29 17.2 9.7 21.6 13.3
30-39 20.6 20.0 25.3 26.2
40-49 22.7 25.4 25.2 29.4
50-59 16.0 17.8 16.9 19.1
60-69 10.3 11.8 5.8 7.1
70+ 13.2 15.5 5.1 4.8
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TABLE 3: THE DIGITAL DIVIDE, 1999
PART 2
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Population
American Politically Internet Internet
Adults Active Users Political
Partisanship
Republican 31.2 32.5 33.8 35.2
Democratic 37.0 38.5 33.7 34.2
Independent 31.7 29.0 32.5 30.5
Race
White 85.7 87.2 88.0 89.4
Black 8.6 8.2 4.8 4.4
Asian 1.4 0.7 2.0 1.0
Other 4.4 3.9 5.3 5.2
Hispanic
Hispanic 4.7 3.6 5.3 4.9
Not 95.3 96.4 94.7 95.1
Ideology
Liberal 21.2 20.1 22.7 21.2
Moderate 41.2 41.2 42.9 42.3
Conservative 37.7 38.6 34.4 36.6
Computer
Access
Yes 74.4 76.0
No 25.7 24.0
Internet
Access
Yes 49.2 52.2
No 50.8 47.8
Beginning in Table 2, we break down the digital divide by gen-
der, marital status, region, education, and race. The CBS News poll
was comprised of a majority of women (54.2% women and 45.8%
men). The percentages of men and women in the politically-active
population (the second column of Table 2) are almost identical to
those of the adult population. But notice that when we turn to the
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Internet user population, a slight majority of that population is male
(51.5%), which is also true of the Internet-using, politically-active
population in the fourth column.
Next, as to marital status, the adult population is mainly married
(57.0%), with a minority that is single and never married (18.8%),
divorced (13.9%), widowed (8.3%), or separated (2.0%). The main
differences between the adult and politically-active populations are
that the latter has about 5% more adults who are married, most of the
difference coming from the fact that the politically-active population
has also about 5% fewer single but never married adults. But the
Internet-user population is distinct from the adult and politically-
active population: The Internet user population is made up of more
single and never married adults (21.5%) and many fewer widowed
adults. The politically-active and Internet-using population, further-
more, has a high concentration of married adults (68.3%), and many
fewer widowed adults than the adult or politically-active populations.
In terms of region of residence, the CBS News survey consisted
of a plurality of adults from the South (34.9%), followed by the
North Central states (26.5%), the North Eastern states (20.3%), and
last, the West (18.2%). 5 9 The politically-active population is almost
identical in terms of regional representation to the adult population.
But the Internet-user population is almost 5% more concentrated in
the West, a result which is similar when we turn to the Internet-
using, politically-active population.
A plurality of American adults in the CBS News sample re-
ceived a high school degree (34%), followed by some college educa-
tion (26.4%), college degree (18.8%), post-graduate education
(13.5%), and lastly, 7.3% have no high school education at all. The
politically-active population has higher levels of educational attain-
ment. Note that there is an almost 2% higher rate of the population
with some college background, 4% higher rate in the college edu-
cated population, and almost 3% higher rate in the post-graduate
education population. This skewness in the level of educational at-
tainment continues as we shift to the Internet user population, as 30%
of Internet users have some college education, 26% have a
college degree, and almost 21% have post-graduate education. The
59. See CBS NEws SURVEY, supra note 57.
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Internet-using, politically-active population has an even greater edu-
cational skewedness, with almost 29% having a college degree and
23% having a post-graduate education. To emphasize the educa-
tional skewedness to the politically-active, Interet-using population,
note that the politically-active, Internet-using population has 17%
fewer adults with only a high school education, but has 10% more
adults with a college education and 10% more with a post-graduate
education.
The last set of rows in Table 2 focus on the age distributions of
each population. The adult population is concentrated in the thirty to
thirty-nine (20.6%) and forty to forty-nine (22.7%) age groups, vith
17.2% of adults in the eighteen to twenty-nine group, 16.0% in the
fifty to fifty-nine age group, 10.3% in the sixty to sixty-nine age
group, and 13.2% in the seventy and over group. The politically-
active population is decidedly older than the American adult popula-
tion, with only 9.7% in the eighteen to twenty-nine age group in the
politically-active population, but with more in the forty to forty-nine
age group (25.4%) and more in the seventy and older group (15.5%).
On the other hand, the Internet user population has a strong skewness
to the younger age groups, as 21.6% of the Internet-using population
is in the eighteen to twenty-nine group, 25.3% is in the thirty to
thirty-nine age group, 25.5% is in the forty to forty-nine age group.
This skewness towards the younger groups persists when we look at
the politically-active, Internet-using population, which is primarily
concentrated in the thirty to thirty-nine age group (26.2%) and the
forty to forty-nine age group (29.4%). Notice that while the young-
est American adults are slightly less represented in the Internet-
using, politically-active population than in the overall American
adult population, the former population is very much concentrated in
the thirty to thirty-nine and forty to forty-nine age groups.
In Table 3 we continue our examination of the digital divide by
looking at partisanship, race, Hispanic identity, and ideology.
Thirty-seven percent of American adults state they are Democrats,
31.7% claim to be Independents, and 31.2% say they are Republi-
cans in the CBS News 1999 survey data.60 The politically-active
population is somewhat more partisan, as the level of independents
60. See id.
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drops to 29%, with slight increases in Democratic and Republican
identification. Internet users are somewhat less partisan than either
the adult or politically-active population, with 32.5% of the Internet-
using population claiming independence; also, Internet-users are
equally split between the Democratic and Republican parties. Inter-
estingly, when we turn to the last column, we see that the Internet-
using, politically active population is slightly more Republican than
Democratic (35.2% to 34.2%), and a little less independent than the
Internet users population (30.5%).
The CBS News survey provided two different measures of race
and ethnicity. Eighty-five and seven tenths percent of the adult
population in the survey is white, followed by 8.6% black, 4.4%
other, and 1.4% Asian. The politically-active population is about 2%
more white than the adult population. But the Internet-using, and the
Internet-using politically-active populations, are both more strongly
white (88.0% and 89.4%, respectively), with most of the increase
coming at the expense of blacks, which drop to 4.8% and 4.4%, re-
spectively. Hispanic identification, interestingly, shows little differ-
ences across the four populations, primarily because all four popula-
tions are virtually exclusively non-Hispanic.
Ideology is the next item we examine. Most American adults
call themselves moderate (41.2%), or conservative (37.7%), with
only 21.2% saying they are liberal. The politically-active population
is virtually identical to the adult population in ideological identifica-
tion. When we turn to the Internet-using population, they are slightly
more liberal (22.7%) and moderate (42.9%), but less conservative.
But in the final column, we see that the politically-active and Inter-
net-using population is ideologically similar to the adult or politi-
cally-active populations.
Last, to provide an overall sense for the digital divide, we pro-
vide in Table 3 the breakdown of the extent of computer and Internet
access for the adult and politically-active populations. Note that
74.4% of the adult population has computer access, and that slightly
higher rates of politically-active adults have access to a computer
(76%). But the adult population is almost evenly divided as to
whether they have Internet access, as 49.2% said they had Internet
access in 1999 and 50.8% said they did not. Slightly higher rates
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of the politically-active have access to the Internet, as 52.2% said
they had Internet access.
What can we conclude after our examination of the digital di-
vide? First, it is clear that roughly half of the adult or politically ac-
tive populations do not have Internet access; thus, roughly half of the
adult or politically active populations would have difficulty access-
ing the Internet for electronic balloting purposes. Of course, two
things could help resolve this problem-the continuing expansion of
Internet access throughout America and the fact that electronic bal-
loting places can be established for individuals who do not have
regular Internet access.
What do we know about the likely users of electronic balloting,
i.e., the politically-active, Internet-using population, relative to the
adult population from this analysis? They are more likely to be
male, to be married, to have high educational attainment, to be
younger, but not in the very young group, eighteen to twenty-nine,
and to be slightly more Republican and white.61 These differences
suggest that electronic balloting is most likely to be accessible to
certain segments of the adult population, and that some of these dif-
ferences raise serious legal concerns about electronic balloting. As
the likely audience for electronic balloting is skewed towards whites
and away from blacks, we believe that electronic balloting will face
serious voting rights challenges in the near future. Additionally,
electronic balloting might face political challenges from other likely
impacted groups-women, the elderly, and those with lower levels
of educational attainment. Thus as long as these digital divides exist
in America, we believe that caution is in order regarding the imple-
mentation of electronic balloting.
IV. THE ARIZONA DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY
A recent and extensive use of the Internet for voting occurred
this spring in Arizona. 62 In what technically was a private election,
61. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 56.
62. See Frederick I. Solop, Digital Democracy Comes of Age in Arizona:
Participation and Politics in the First Binding Internet Election (prepared for
presentation at the American Political Science Association national conference,
Washington, D.C., Aug. 31-Sept. 3, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the Northern Arizona University Department of Political Science), avail-
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contracted and conducted by the Arizona state Democratic party to
select delegates for the Democratic National Convention, registered
Democratic voters were given four different ways to cast ballots:
through remote Internet voting during the four days before the Satur-
day, March 11, 2000 primary; through traditional vote-by-mail ab-
sentee voting; through in-precinct paper ballots; or by in-precinct
electronic balloting.63 Thus the 2000 Internet election in Arizona
provides a very important datum from which to assess the potential
political consequences of Internet voting.
However, the 2000 Democratic primary in Arizona was experi-
mental in another way, as Arizona has not had much experience with
presidential primaries for either party. In 1996, the Arizona Republi-
can party held the first real primary in the state, largely at the initia-
tive of John McCain, who worked to get an Arizona Republican pri-
mary in late February to help the candidacy of Phil Gramm.
64
Arizona Democrats also wanted to run a February primary in 1996,
but national Democratic party rules forbade such an early primary
and the Democratic party had to settle with a small-scale, party-run
preference vote at only a very limited number of polling locations.
As Cook notes: "turnout for the Democratic event has been com-
paratively light. The last competitive contest in 1992 drew barely
35,000 voters-slightly more than the 10 percent of the turnout for
the Republican presidential primary in 1996. "65
The Arizona Democratic Internet voting experiment in 2000 oc-
curred at a time in the Democratic nomination contest when the out-
come had been decided; after the round of primaries, on March 7,
2000, it became quite clear that Al Gore would win the Democratic
nomination.66 While an important statewide experiment with Inter-
net voting, the Arizona Democratic primary was held after the real
race was over; and thus many voters may have stayed away from the
polls.
able at http://pro.harvard.edu/papers/036/ 03015SolopFrede.pdf.
63. See id.
64. See RHODES COOK, UNITED STATES PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY
ELECTIONS 1968-1996: A HANDBOOK OF ELECTION STATISTICS 60 (2000).
65. Id.
66. See A Day for Front Runners, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2000, at B6 ("There
is no question now that Gore will become the [Democratic] nominee in Los
Angeles in August.").
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Even so, the Arizona Democratic primary Internet voting proc-
ess was relatively straightforward. Registered Democratic voters in
Arizona received personal identification numbers (PIN's) in the mail
in February and March. These PIN numbers were generated by the
company hired by the Arizona Democratic party to conduct the
Internet election, Election.com. 67 Voters who wanted to cast ballots
over the Internet were allowed to do so beginning at 12:01 a.m. on
Tuesday, March 7 through midnight on Friday, March 10.68 During
this period, voters needed to log on to one of two web sites run by
the Democratic party and Election.com; the log-in process required
that the voter accept the election rules, enter a PIN, and then answer
two personal questions. 69 The PIN and the two personal questions
were matched against voter registration records, and once verified, a
ballot would appear on the voter's computer screen. The voter then
would click on their choice of candidate, click YES to confirm their
choice, and receive electronic confirmation of the ballot.
70
The remote Internet voting was closed on Friday, March 10. On
Saturday, March 11, voting was allowed in-person at 124 polling
places established by the Democratic party. Most of the 124 polling
places had electronic voting machines, as well as traditional paper
ballots. PIN numbers were used on primary election day (March 11)
to insure that a voter did not cast more than one ballot.
7 1
Thus, the Arizona Democratic Presidential Primary in 2000
gives us an important way to examine the representational implica-
tions of Internet voting. The Arizona Democratic party has provided
data from their presidential primary which details the number of
ballots cast using each type of electoral participation: remote Inter-
net voting, absentee vote-by-mail, electronic voting in the polling
place, and traditional paper-based balloting in polling places. This
data is provided for each of the fifteen Arizona counties, which we
have merged with voter registration data from the Arizona Secretary
67. See Solop, supra note 62, at 4-5.
68. See id.
69. See id.; see also Ariz. Democrats Making History, Ariona Democratic
Presidential Primary: Casting a Vote (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review).
70. See Solop, supra note 62, at 4-5.
71. See id.
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of State and with data on county economic and demographic profiles
from the Arizona Department of Commerce.
We report the percentages of votes cast in the 2000 Arizona
Democratic primary in Table 4. Overall, 35,768 or 41% of the bal-
lots were cast using remote Internet voting. This was closely fol-
lowed by traditional vote-by-mail, which constituted almost 32,747
or 38% of the ballots cast in this election. Together, remote Internet
or absentee voting accounted for 79% of the votes cast in this elec-
tion. Most of the remaining ballots were cast in precincts using pa-
per ballots (16%) or electronic voting machines in polling places
(5%).
TABLE 4: BALLOT CHOICES, 2000 ARIZONA DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY72
Percen age of Votes Cast Per Ballot Type
Polling PollingCounty Internet Mail Electronic Paper
Apache 27.03 26.78 28.16 18.02
Cochise 42.20 33.16 6.03 18.61
Coconino 49.85 25.76 11.43 12.95
Gila 32.22 35.55 5.62 26.61
Graham 28.76 27.68 8.37 35.19
Greenlee 36.36 36.36 1.65 25.62
La Paz 26.79 58.04 0.45 14.73
Maricopa 43.02 40.64 3.97 12.37
Mohave 39.32 10.09 7.65 42.93
Navaj o 28.62 32.67 7.33 31.38
Pima 42.03 32.98 2.84 22.15
Pinal 34.19 38.98 2.01 24.82
Santa Cruz 27.41 34.86 5.25 32.49
Yavapai 37.01 40.10 5.78 17.10
Yuma 33.12 51.77 3.36 11.75
State 41.16 37.68 4.80 16.36
72. See Ariz. Democrats, Paper Ballots vs. Internet Votes, at
http://www.azdem.org/breakdown.html (Jan. 11, 2001); Ariz. Dep't of Com-
merce, Arizona Demographics: Population by County, at
http://www.azcommerce.com/datapages/demograp.html (last modified Dec. 8,
2000) [hereinafter Arizona Demographics].
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However, there was significant variation across the fifteen
counties in the use of Internet balloting. In Coconino County (north-
central Arizona, including Flagstaff), almost 50% of the ballots were
cast using remote Internet voting; in three other counties, i.e., Co-
chise (southeastern Arizona), Maricopa (south-central Arizona, in-
cluding Phoenix), and Pima (southern Arizona, including Tucson),
Internet voting rates were 40% or higher. On the other end of the
distribution were five counties with Internet voting rates just greater
than 25% (Apache, Graham, La Paz, Navajo, and Santa Cruz coun-
ties).
Though many ballots were cast using the Internet in the 2000
Arizona Democratic Presidential Primary, turnout in this election
was quite low.73 Statewide turnout (the number of ballots cast as a
percentage of registered Democratic voters) was only 10.59%, as we
show in Table 5. Unfortunately, as we noted earlier,74 the Demo-
cratic presidential race was already decided by the time Arizona's
Democrats were able to vote, which no doubt depressed turnout in
this particular election. Even with this fact in mind, turnout in this
presidential primary was much lower in Arizona than in previous
statewide primaries in 1998, 1996, and 1994, which averaged
23.94%.75
73. See COOK, supra note 64.
74. See id.; see also supra note 65 and accompanying text.
75. See COOK, supra note 64, at 60. As we noted above, the Arizona
Democratic Party before 2000 did not conduct a true statewide presidential
primary, so it is impossible to make comparisons to earlier Democratic presi-
dential primaries. The statewide primaries involve state and local partisan
primaries, as well as various ballot measures, which provide many stimuli to
attract voters to the polls. On the other hand, presidential races are very salient
and are often accompanied by much media attention, which fuel voter interest
and participation. In the end, the previous statewide primary turnout data pro-
vide a solid indication of the general propensity of Arizona voters to partici-
pate in primary elections.
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TABLE 5: TURNOUT IN ARIZONA 2000, COMPARED TO
PREVIOUS PRIMARIES
76
Turnout of Registered Voters in
I_ Democratic Primaries
2000 1998 1996 1994 1994-98Couty Turnout Turnout Turnout Turnout Average
Apache 2.97 24.32 34.30 35.01 31.21
Cochise 8.64 27.78 33.70 38.14 33.21
Coconino 5.56 12.01 23.08 20.57 18.55
Gila 8.73 33.23 42.40 44.75 40.13
Graham 4.99 24.70 52.95 39.09 38.91
Greenlee 2.91 48.20 58.41 43.57 50.06
La Paz 6.08 14.05 32.62 28.66 25.11
Maricopa 13.33 10.54 14.03 29.89 18.15
Mohave 7.37 20.65 21.91 29.95 24.17
Navajo 4.47 19.46 29.05 34.97 27.83
Pima 9.41 15.96 26.15 29.83 23.98
Pinal 7.38 29.03 33.93 38.29 33.75
Santa 6.05 22.24 48.19 44.97 38.47
Cruz
Yavapai 14.14 15.82 15.97 36.48 22.76
Yuma 7.06 23.57 28.71 26.64 26.31
State 10.59 19.66 23.57 28.58 23.94
Again, we see significant county-by-county variation in turnout
in the 2000 Arizona Democratic Primary. Two counties, i.e.,
Yavapai (north-central Arizona, including Prescott) and Maricopa,
had turnouts in the 13% to 14% range in the 2000 Democratic Pri-
mary, but two other counties had virtually no voter turnout at all
(Apache [northeast Arizona] and Greenlee [eastern Arizona]). Most
of the remaining Arizona counties saw voter participation in the 5%
to 9% range in this election. Thus, we see significant variance in
voter participation in the 2000 Democratic Presidential Primary.
76. See id.
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Significantly, when we contrast the 2000 Democratic turnout
with the turnout from recent previous statewide primaries at the
county level, we see that there is a negative correlation; that is,
counties which had low 2000 voter participation had higher 1994,
1996, or 1998 participation rates. 77 We can see this in Table 5 when
we examine counties at either extreme: Yavapai County had 14%
participation in 2000, but 23% participation in statewide primaries
from 1994-1998; Greenlee County had 2.91% participation in 2000,
but 50% participation in the 1994-1998 statewide primaries. Thus
the evidence is clear and systematic, showing that turnout in the 2000
Arizona Democratic Presidential Primary was high in historically
lower turnout counties but low in historically high turnout counties.
Our interest in turnout regarding the Arizona 2000 Democratic
Presidential Primary goes to the heart of what we view as the central,
narrow legal question about the use of Internet voting: Does Internet
voting have a negative impact on minority voting rights? 78 To pres-
ent a more tightly focused analysis regarding this narrow legal ques-
tion, we compare turnout of white and non-white citizens/voters in
the 1998 statewide Democratic Primary in Arizona to the 2000 turn-
out in the Democratic Presidential Primary.
As we noted earlier, since the Democratic Party in Arizona had
never previously conducted a true statevide presidential primary
prior to 2000, it is impossible to produce a comparison to turnout in
earlier Democratic presidential primaries. Instead, we observe the
turnout in statevide primaries as indications of the underlying pro-
pensity of Arizona Democrats to participate in primary elections. As
we demonstrated above, there is a relatively high degree of consis-
tency in Democratic turnout across the recent statewide primary
elections in Arizona. The problem, of course, is that Democratic
turnout rates for whites and non-whites are not collected nor reported
in Arizona. This means that we must use the known Democratic
77. The correlation coefficients are -.45 (2000 and 1998), -.65 (2000 and
1996), -.12 (2000 and 1994), and -.51 (2000 and the 1994-1998 average).
78. We are focusing in this analysis only on the voting rights question re-
garding non-Native American minority voters in Arizona. It could also be the
case that the voting rights of Native Americans in Arizona's Internet voting
primary could be impacted, but we do not examine that question here. The
categories of white and non-white voters, as we use them, are exclusive of Na-
tive Americans.
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turnout rates for 1998 and 2000, as well as known estimates of the
racial composition of Arizona counties to estimate the white and
non-white Democratic turnout rates in each Arizona county for each
election.79 This is probably familiar to readers as the common "eco-
logical inference" problem-using geographically aggregated data to
produce estimates of individual-level behavior. We use a recently
developed method to estimate the white and non-white Democratic
turnout rates, a method that produces ecological estimates with rea-
sonable statistical properties under a set of reasonable assumptions.
80
Our ecological estimates of white and non-white Democratic
turnout in each of Arizona's counties in 1998 and 2000 is given in
Table 6. The three left columns give the estimates of white Demo-
cratic turnout, while the three right columns give the estimates of
non-white Democratic turnout.
TABLE 6: RACE AND TURNOUT, 1998 AND 2000
ARIZONA DEMOCRATIC PRIMARIES
White Democratic Non-White Democratic
County Turnout Turnout
1998 2000 Change 1998 2000 Change
Apache 16.42 2.38 -14.04 50.62 4.93 -45.69
Cochise 16.49 10.67 -5.82 47.03 5.19 -41.84
Coconino 9.39 5.70 -3.69 19.79 5.13 -14.66
Gila 22.51 9.74 -12.77 69.81 5.27 -64.54
Graham 15.91 4.97 -10.94 42.82 5.03 -37.79
Greenlee 23.52 1.45 -22.07 77.88 4.68 -73.20
La Paz 11.34 6.28 -5.06 30.26 4.90 -25.36
Maricopa 8.29 15.11 6.82 21.01 5.06 -15.95
Mohave 18.33 7.54 -10.79 51.72 5.15 -46.57
Navajo 14.14 4.32 -9.82 35.15 4.94 -30.21
79. See Betsey Bayless, Elections, at http://www.sosaz.con/ election/ (last
visited Feb. 12, 2000). For economic and demographic data provided by the
Arizona Department of Commerce, see Arizona Demographics, supra note 72.
80. See GARY KING, A SOLUTION TO THE ECOLOGICAL INFERENCE
PROBLEM: RECONSTRUCTING INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR FROM AGGREGATE
DATA 91-122 (1997).
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White Democratic Non-White Democratic
County Turnout Turnout
1998 2000 Change 1998 2000 Change
Pima 12.62 11.26 -1.36 23.53 5.24 -18.29
Pinal 18.13 8.70 -9.43 47.95 5.09 -42.86
Santa 15.74 10.08 -5.66 23.95 4.99 -18.96
Cruz
Yavapai 13.67 14.92 1.25 40.44 5.09 -35.35
Yuma 14.28 8.77 -5.51 34.75 5.01 -29.74
Averages -7.26 -36.07
Not surprisingly, as noted above, turnout was low in the 2000
Democratic Primary, as observed in Table 6, where turnout fell be-
tween 1998 and 2000 for both whites and non-whites. However, the
legally and politically significant fact is that the average rate of de-
crease for non-white turnout was five times greater than the average
rate of decrease for white turnout. Secondly, notice that in two Ari-
zona counties-Maricopa and Yavapai Counties-white turnout ac-
tually increased in the 2000 Democratic Presidential Primary from
the levels in 1998. Contrast this with the fact that non-white turnout
declined between 1998 and 2000 in every Arizona county. We see
the evidence in Table 6 as an indication that non-white voting rights
might have been seriously impacted in 2000 by the introduction of
Internet voting. However, the data we have presented so far from the
2000 Arizona Democratic Presidential Primary in 2000 in Tables 5
and 6 tells us little about the implications of Internet voting for po-
litical representation. In order to shed some light on this important
question, we turn to multivariate analysis.
8'
Our multivariate analysis focuses on one dependent variable,
measured at the county level: the proportion of ballots cast in each
county using the remote Internet option, out of all ballots cast in
the county. Of course, two caveats must be raised about this
81. Multivariate analysis uses several descriptive variables in a statistical
model to explain the variation in a dependent or response variable. Impor-
tantly, multivariate analysis allows the researcher to examine the impact of one
descriptive variable on the dependent variable, holding all other descriptive
variables constant. See EDWARD R. TRUFLE, DATA ANALYSIS FOR POLITICS
AND POLICY 2-5 (1974).
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multivariate analysis. First, we are sharply limited in our analysis by
the fact that we have only fifteen observations, which curtails our
ability to include many independent variables on the right-hand side
of each analysis. Second, we are conducting an analysis at an aggre-
gated level, thus our results might be subject to various ecological in-
ference critiques.
82
With those caveats in mind, we have one last complication to
discuss regarding this analysis. Our dependent variable is a propor-
tion, namely, the proportion of voters who cast an Internet vote. The
appropriate econometric technique for analyzing proportions data of
this sort is grouped logit.83 The grouped logit technique is very
similar to the more familiar logit, probit, or logistic regression tech-
niques for binary choice data. In fact, one simple intuitive way to
think about grouped logit is as a method which uses the proportions
data to estimate something like an individual-level model where the
dependent variable is a binary choice and the independent variables
are attributes of the decision-maker.
84
In this grouped logit analysis, we test whether or not the 2000
Democratic Presidential Primary in Arizona adversely impacted vot-
ers who do not have ready access to the Internet; those members of
American society who are on the wrong side of the digital divide.
85
The important demographic groups we analyze are women, the eld-
erly, the non-white, the unemployed, and residents of rural areas.
We have tested whether members of these various groups were more
or less likely to use Internet voting in the 2000 Arizona Democratic
Presidential Primary.
While all of these groups are on the wrong side of the digital di-
vide, one group is of particular legal importance-the non-white
residents of Arizona. This particular legal concern revolves around
the possibility that Internet voting systems might be challenged un-
der Section 2 of the 1964 Voting Rights Act, which "prohibited any
82. See KING, supra note 80, at 158-96. For example, aggregation bias
might plague our ability to use the aggregated data to make inferences about
individuals. However, our sample is so limited that we do not believe that us-
ing alternative ecological inference techniques is possible.
83. See WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 834-35 (4th ed.
2000).
84. See Appendix infra.
85. See discussion supra Part III.
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'voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice,
or procedure' that denied or abridged the right to vote on the basis of
race or color."86 Thus we will focus particular attention on non-
whites and Internet voting in the 2000 Arizona Democratic Presi-
dential Primary.
Our specification of the grouped logit model is straightforward.
As discussed above, the model we use has as a dependent variable
the proportion of Democratic ballots cast in 2000 that were cast us-
ing the Internet. This is measured at the county level. The right-
hand side variables are also measured in proportions. We include the
proportion of the county that is female, the proportion of the county
that is elderly (over 65 years of age), and the proportion of the
county that is non-white. We also include the county unemployment
rate, and the proportion of the population of the county which resides
in an urban area.
We begin our presentation of these grouped logit results with
Table 7, which gives the maximum-likelihood grouped logit esti-
mates and their associated standard errors. Estimates which are
marked with an asterisk ("*") are ones which are statistically signifi-
cant at the p = .05 level or better. In this table, we also provide esti-
mates of the marginal effects of each independent variable on a hy-
pothetical voter.
8 7
86. KousSER, supra note 15, at 55 (quoting Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42
U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1994)).
87. Readers versed in the political methodology literature will be familiar
with these marginal effect estimates, which are commonly called "first differ-
ences." Essentially we start with a hypothetical individual, in this case a voter
who lives in an urbanized area, is white, male, non-elderly and employed. We
compute the probability that this voter would cast an Internet ballot, relative to
the other ballot options (which we estimate to be .73). Ve then alter one char-
acteristic at a time, each time computing the new probability; for example, we
next change this hypothetical voter to be female, and compute the probability
that she would cast an Internet ballot (which we estimate to be .30). In the ta-
ble, we then report the difference between the baseline probability and the
probability for each "new" voter.
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TABLE 7: GROUPED LOGIT ANALYSES,
ARIZONA DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY
Choice of Internet Vote
Variable Logit MarginalEstimates Impact
Constant .25
.71
Female -1.76 .43
1.49
Elderly -1.71* .42
.33
Non-White -.37* .08
.11
Unemployed -1.07* .40
.24
Urban Resident .75* .17
.07
Note: Entries in left column are grouped logit maximum likeli-
hood estimates, followed by their associated standard errors. An
asterisk (*) indicates a coefficient significant at the p =.05 level.
Entries in right column are estimates of marginal impacts of
each independent variable for a hypothetical voter, changing the
particular variable from high to low while holding the other
variable constant.
In the first column of Table 7 we present results for Internet
voting rates. In this analysis, four of the five demographic variables
have statistically significant effects; the coefficient for females,
while negative, cannot be statistically differentiated from zero. The
other coefficients, however, do provide important tests of our hy-
potheses about Internet voting. Ceteris paribus, the elderly, the non-
white, and the unemployed all were statistically less likely to engage
in Internet voting. Additionally, those who lived in rural areas were
less likely to engage in Internet voting. Thus we have clear evidence
that those citizens on the wrong side of the digital divide were
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less likely to engage in Internet voting than were those citizens on
the right side of the divide.
Next, we turn to the strength of each of these demographic ef-
fects within these grouped logit models. To do this, we transform
our results into hypothetical estimate probabilities for each type of
voter, relative to some hypothetical baseline voter (urban resident,
non-elderly, white, employed, and male). These are reported in the
final column of Table 7. We see that the estimated magnitude of
each demographic voter attribute clusters into two groups: gender,
age, and employment status on the one hand, each of which has a
relatively strong impact on the propensity to use the Internet as a
voting option; and race and urbanization on the other hand, both of
which have weaker but statistically significant impacts on the likeli-
hood that a hypothetical Arizona Democratic voter would use the
Internet to vote in this primary election.
Thus, the results in Table 7 demonstrate clearly that those peo-
ple on the wrong side of the digital divide-women, the elderly, the
non-white, the unemployed, and rural residents-were less likely to
use the Internet to vote in the 2000 Arizona Democratic Presidential
Primary. These findings have two implications for the basic themes
of this paper. First, regarding the narrow legal question of the impact
of Internet voting on minority voting rights, we again see evidence
which makes us pessimistic about how Internet voting should be
viewed in the context of the Voting Rights Act: non-white voters did
not vote on the Internet as often as whites, so the Internet voting op-
tion seems unlikely to improve the voting rights of minorities. In-
stead, Internet voting seems likely to weaken the voting rights of mi-
norities, as in this particular case minority turnout dropped
substantially more than did white turnout.
Second, regarding the broader political representation question,
we observe that as long as the digital divide exists in American soci-
ety, those behind the digital divide will not see enhanced political
representation as a result of Internet voting.88 Some low propensity
voters, like non-whites or the unemployed, might see further reduc-
tions in the quality and strength of their political representation as a
result of the introduction of widespread Internet voting. Some low
88. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 56, at 16.
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propensity voters, in particular the younger generations of voters,
might see enhanced political representation with the introduction of
Internet voting as this might make younger voters more likely to
participate in politics. Thus, if Internet voting were widely used in
American politics, it would change the character of political repre-
sentation, with some specific groups behind the digital divide (mi-
norities, the unemployed, and the elderly) losing further political
power while other groups (especially the young and those in urban
areas) might see increased political power.
V. THE POLITICS OF INTERNET VOTING
Despite the digital divide, and the possible problems it presents
for Internet voting discussed in the last two sections of this paper, is
the public ready to support widespread Internet voting? If not, is
there an identifiable constituency which backs Internet voting? On
these questions, there has been little systematic research, and virtu-
ally no easily obtainable data. Instead, in this section we report on
the few survey studies which have been conducted regarding public
support for Internet voting.
Some polls have been conducted nationally on preferences for or
against Internet voting.89 For example, in July, 1999, ABC News
conducted a national telephone poll in which 42% of the adult re-
spondents stated that they would be willing to vote over the Internet
if such a balloting process could be made secure. 90 Support, how-
ever, was much greater for younger adults, as 61% of those aged
eighteen to thirty-four said they would be willing to participate in
Internet elections. 91 Much of the reluctance of these survey respon-
dents to back Internet voting seems to arise from their uncertainty
about the security of the process: 26% stated that the Internet elec-
tions "could be made secure from fraud anytime in the near future,"
while 69% said that making Internet elections secure would take
"many years" or that it would "never happen." 92 Even younger
89. See Gary Langer, Virtual Voting: Poll Finds Most Oppose Online
Ballots, ABCNEWS.com, July 21, 2000, at http://abcnews.go.
com/sections/politics/ DailyNews/pol1990721.html.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. Id.
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voters remain to be convinced of the security of Internet voting, as
60% of the eighteen to thirty-four year olds said that making Internet
elections secure would take "many years."
93
In recent telephone interviews in Arizona, Solop found that 56%
of Arizona adults thought that Internet voting should be included as
an option in all future statewide elections in Arizona. 94 Solop also
found the same sort of age gap in preferences for and against Internet
voting in Arizona that ABC News identified in 1999; 61% of voters
age eighteen to twenty-nine favored including Internet voting as an
option in Arizona statewide elections, while only 47% of those over
sixty years of age favored such a plan.95 Support for Internet voting
also rose in Solop's study with educational attainment and income.
96
The issue of Internet voting was also studied in California. In
December, 1999, the Public Policy Institute of California (hereinafter
"PPIC") Statewide Survey found that California adults were deeply
divided over whether they favored or opposed a system that would
allow Californians to vote in elections over the Internet.97 Forty-
seven percent of those polled favored such a system, 48% opposed it,
and only 5% had no opinion. 98 We provide details of the PPIC sur-
vey on Internet voting in California in Table 8.
93. Id.
94. See Solop, supra note 62, at 13.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See MARK BALDASSARE, PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE OF CALIFORNIA
STATEWIDE SURVEY: CALIFORNIANS AND THEIR GOVERNMENT 31 (1999).
98. See id.
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TABLE 8: INTERNET VOTING IN CALIFORNIA 99
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Partisanship
All Not Lati- Internet
Democrats Republicans OtherAdults Registered nos Users
Internet
Voting
Favor 47 50 40 52 53 50 54
Oppose 48 45 56 44 41 45 37
Don't
Know 5 5 4 4 6 6 9
Ballot
Type
Ballot
Box 46 47 49 45 39 47 41
Absentee 23 23 26 19 21 23 *
Internet 30 29 24 36 37 27 40
Don't
Know I 1 1 0 3 3
*Note: Results from the December,
tute of California Statewide Survey.
1999, Public Policy Insti-
The preferences for and against Internet voting in the 1999 PPIC
poll in California differ in important ways across citizens. There is a
clear partisan division in California over Internet voting, with 50% of
Democrats and 52% of those registered in some way other than with
the two major parties supporting Internet voting; and 56% of Repub-
licans opposing Internet voting. 10 Importantly, a majority of survey
respondents who are not registered (53%) state they favor
99. See id. The PPIC report did not break down the responses of the re-
maining 19%, but it is likely that most if not all of these Internet users pre-
ferred the absentee ballot.
100. See id.
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Internet voting.' 10 Also, Latino respondents slightly favored Internet
voting (50% in support, 45% in opposition, 5% no opinion).10 2
The PPIC survey also included another question about Internet
voting: "If you had the choice, would you prefer to vote in elections
at the ballot box, by absentee mail ballot, or over the Internet?"'
0 3
As we present in Table 8, when given this menu of ballot choices
(similar to the Arizona menu), 30% of respondents said they would
use the Internet. Forty-six percent would use the traditional ballot
box means of voting, while 23% would vote by mail. The menu of
ballot choices, broken down by party registration, shows that Internet
voting has the strongest support among Californians who are not
registered with the tvo major parties (36% would pick Internet vot-
ing from the menu) and with those not registered at all (37% would
pick Internet voting). Latinos in California are not very different
from the rest of the sample of adults, as 27% would pick the Internet.
Perhaps not surprisingly, Internet users are almost as likely to say
they would use the Internet to vote as they would be to use the tradi-
tional ballot box to cast their ballots.1
4
Thus, Internet voting appears to currently enjoy some support,
both nationally and in at least two important states involved in the
Internet voting revolution. However, Internet voting seems only able
to muster bare majority support at present, implying that this political
reform may not necessarily be wildly supported in the future. In
comparison, two recent political reforms on the ballot in California,
Propositions 208 (campaign finance reform in the 1996 general elec-
tion) and 198 (primary election reform in the 1996 primary election)
both achieved roughly 60% support or better when they passed, de-
spite facing significant opposition. 05 As Internet voting is only able
to achieve 45% to 50% support in public opinion polls in a time
where there has not been a concerted effort to oppose Internet voting
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. Id.
104. See id.
105. See 1996 GENERAL ELECTION RETURNS FOR BALLOT PROPOSITIONS,
available at http://Vote96.ss.ca.gov/Vote96/html/vote/prop/age.961218083
528.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2001); 1996 PRIMARY ELECTION: BALLOT
PROPOSITIONS, available at http://Primary96.ss.ca.gov/e/returnsprop/page.
960504080000.html (ast visited Feb. 12, 2001).
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makes us pessimistic about contemporary public support for Internet
voting.
VI. CONCLUSION
We believe that based on the evidence we have presented, Inter-
net voting is likely to exacerbate the current problem of class-bias in
American elections if it is introduced any time in the near future. We
have shown that previous reforms to ease voting or registration have
tended to be taken advantage of by those of higher socio-economic
status. 106 Similarly, based on the current digital divide, Internet vot-
ing is a reform ripe to be taken advantage of by those with higher so-
cio-economic status. Adopting a system of voting whereby people of
sufficient means can vote from the convenience of their homes using
a technology they find routine and regularly use for everything from
checking stock price quotations to examining movie schedules to
doing mail-order shopping, while people of lesser means must brave
the uncertain weather of early November to find a local polling place
hardly seems like an election reform likely to lead to fairer or more
representative elections. While there is a tendency to view increased
participation as a good thing, if that increased participation occurs
primarily among those who are already over-represented at the poll-
ing place, then increased participation can be a bad thing.
As Internet penetration increases in the United States, Internet
voting will become a more viable alternative. As the penetration rate
rises, the potential for Internet voting to raise the turnout rates of the
huge number of non-voting people lower on the socio-economic
scale could outweigh the greater individual propensity for people on
the higher end of the scale to take advantage of it. But right now,
Internet voting would be the equivalent of "motor voter: for luxury
car drivers only."
106. See ELECTION SUMMARY REPORT, available at http://Vote98.ss.ca.gov/
Misc/Summary.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2001); 1998 PRIMARY ELECTION
SUMMARY OF THE "STATEMENT OF THE VoTE", available at http://Primary98.
ss.ca.gov/Final/SOVSummary.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2001).
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APPENDIX
The log-likelihood function for the binary choice model
l ,N
is log L7:.1 (yi log F(xifl) + (1- yi) log[1 - (xf/)]) where F is
either the normal or logistic distribution. The grouped
logit log-likelihood function is very similar:
logL= Ni(Pi log(xifl) + (1- Pi) log[l - F(x, fl)]) where again
F is the logistic function, ni is the number of individuals in the
population, and Pi is the proportion of the ni individuals who respond
with yi =1.
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